2010 Municipal Election Report
February 1, 2011
The Office of the City Auditor conducted this project in accordance with the *International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing*
2010 Municipal Election Report

1. Introduction
The 2010 Municipal Election project was approved in the Office of the City Auditor’s 2010 Annual Workplan. The City of Edmonton, like all municipalities in Alberta, is mandated to conduct elections for Mayor and Councillors on a three-year cycle. Each municipal election in Alberta is overseen by a Returning Officer, who is responsible for conducting the election in accordance with legislation. Edmonton’s City Clerk was appointed by name as the designated Returning Officer for the City of Edmonton for the 2010 Municipal Election. The election took place on October 18, 2010. As for the past eight elections, the Returning Officer asked us to provide control and process-related input as appropriate during the planning process and to observe and report on the overall integrity of the 2010 Municipal Election. This oversight has supported the Returning Officer’s commitment to continuous improvement in response to the recommendations of the Office of the City Auditor.

2. Background
Election planning is a complex process, typically taking about two years of intensive effort by the Election Planning Team to ensure that Election Day proceeds as smoothly as possible. The conduct of Edmonton’s 2010 Municipal Election was governed by the Local Authorities Election Act, associated regulations, and the City’s Election Bylaw.

From the public’s perspective, the municipal election process begins with Nomination Day and finishes on Election Day. The planning before Election Day and reconciliations that follow, while critically important, are much lower profile and may not attract public attention. Alberta’s Local Authorities Election Act assigns responsibilities to the Returning Officer, voters, candidates, and campaign workers. For example, the Returning Officer is responsible for doing all things necessary to conduct an election. Candidates are responsible for the accuracy and completeness of their nomination papers. Citizens nominating a candidate must live within the ward in which the candidate is running, or they are not permitted to act as a nominee. Candidates are also required to comply with newly-enacted election finance disclosure rules. Failure to satisfy the requirements of the Act may constitute an election offence.

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1 Local Authorities Election Act, R. S. A. 2000, c. L-21, s. 10(1), Alberta Queen’s Printer, Edmonton, AB, September 10, 2010.
2 Election Act, s. 14.
3 City of Edmonton Bylaw 15307, Election Bylaw, s. 7 and Delegation, General Manager, Corporate Services Department to City Clerk, s. 21, October 1, 2009,
4 Election Act, s. 14.
5 Election Act, s. 21(1), 27(1)(a), 27(3), and 28(1.1).
6 Election Act, s. 27(3).
7 Election Act, Part 5.1.
8 Election Act, Part 6.
For the 2010 Municipal Election, the Returning Officer established regular voting stations (223), continuous advance stations at City Hall (2), two weekend ward-based advance stations (22), institutional stations (42 stations covered 111 locations), hospital stations (5 stations covered 10 locations), and a special ballot station, with 199,359 total votes cast (33.4 percent of eligible voters).

For the 2010 Municipal Election, the Returning Officer organized the Election Planning Team as shown in Chart 1.

Chart 1 - Election Planning Team Structure

The Election Planning Team was subdivided into a Decision Team, a Program Team, an Operations Team, and Specialist Resources to address process matters and issues as they arose. The Specialist Resources consisted of representatives from the Law Branch, Client Financial Services Branch, and Office of the City Auditor. The Specialist Resource members served as resources to the Election project and participated in election planning meetings on an as-requested basis rather than attending every meeting. This resulted in different workloads on specialist resources than in previous elections. The specialists maintained contact with the Manager of Elections and Census and attended meetings as requested by either the Election Decision Team or the Manager of Elections and Census. The specialists also requested meetings as required and had access to the Election’s SharePoint site and could monitor progress through that site.

3. Objective

Our primary objective as a Specialized Resource supporting the 2010 Municipal Election Decision team was to provide assurance that the 2010 Municipal Election planning and execution were conducted:

- In accordance with legislation,
• In a manner that ensured the accuracy and auditability of the vote, and
• In compliance with election procedures as outlined in the City’s Presiding Deputy Returning Officer (PD) and Assistant Deputy Returning Officer (APD) Training Manual.9

4. Scope and Methodology
All 2010 Municipal Election planning processes and outcomes (including Election Day through final ballot reconciliation) were in scope. We did not make any operational decisions or approve the processes or procedures chosen by the Administration.

Throughout the election process, we worked closely with the Manager of Elections and Census, who the Returning Officer designated as our contact for operational and process matters. We also met with the Returning Officer and the Assistant Returning Officer as appropriate.

During the course of our involvement with the Election Planning Team, we also monitored the degree of implementation of the four recommendations from our 2007 Municipal Election Report.

As requested by the Manager of Elections & Census, we reviewed process documentation (including voting station and mail-in ballot procedures and ballot tabulators), training materials, and other materials (e.g., candidate lists) that had potential to impact the effectiveness, accuracy, or auditability of the voting process.

In addition to that involvement, we reviewed logic and accuracy testing of a selected sample of the ballot tabulators and memory cards. The purpose of logic and accuracy testing was to ensure that each machine accurately records and reports actual ballots cast. All voting machines and memory cards scheduled to be used in advance voting or on Election Day (including spares) were tested by the contractor using specially marked ballots and verified by Election Office and contractor staff.

On selected advance voting days and during Election Day, we visited selected voting stations to observe the voting process and provide feedback to the Returning Officer on the overall integrity of the election process throughout the election process, including Election Day. We also assigned audit staff to all five Remote Accumulation Sites, Election Central, the Results Centre, and selected voting stations as they closed.

On Election Day, we assisted the Returning Officer with resolving any issues that arose during the day and observed the voting data collection and compilation processes. Including observations at advance voting stations and our observations on Election Day,

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9 The Presiding Deputy Returning Officer (PD) and Assistant Presiding Deputy Returning Officer (APD) Training Manual is a training document produced for each election. The manual contains the information the Presiding Deputy Returning Officer and the Assistant Presiding Deputy Returning Officer need in order to operate their voting station in compliance with the Local Authorities Election Act and associated legislation.
we conducted field observations at 108 voting stations (37% of the 294 stations). We also provided control and process-related support at Election Central and at the Results Centre on Election Day.

5. **Status of Recommendations from 2007**

Since the four recommendations from our 2007 Municipal Election Report were made to enhance the 2010 Municipal Election processes, we assessed the implementation status of those recommendations during this project. We concluded that three of the four recommendations are complete. We closed the fourth one and made a new recommendation on the same topic to be implemented for the next Municipal Election in 2013.

5.1. **Recommendation 1 - Training**

The OCA recommends that the Office of the City Clerk incorporate hands-on training scenarios into training sessions for Area Supervisors, Presiding Deputies, Assistant Presiding Deputies, Ballot Clerks, and Ballot Box Clerks to better prepare those workers for situations they may encounter on Election Day.

**Management Status Report:**

For the 2010 Election, workers including: Area Supervisors (Advance/Institutional and Election Day), Ward Coordinators, Ward Coordinator Assistants, Trainers, Project Coordinators, and election day staff (Presiding Deputies, Assistant Presiding Deputies, Ballot Clerks, Tabulator Clerks, Deputy Returning Officers) will receive training prior to election day.

**Planned Implementation:** To be implemented for the 2010 election.

**OCA Observation**

While we observed some improvement in this election’s approach to training (e.g., working through examples and some hands-on training), we believe that additional work needs to be done to enhance hands-on training prior to the next election.

2010 Status Update: **Closed** and carried forward to the new **Recommendation 2** in Section 7 of this report.

5.2. **Recommendation 2 – Contingency plans**

The OCA recommends that the Office of the City Clerk develop contingency plans to ensure that commonly encountered issues are managed consistently from one election to the next.

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10 The Returning Officer provided the “Management Status Report” paragraphs as progress reports during Election Planning.

11 The “OCA Observation” paragraphs are our assessment of recommendation implementation status following the 2010 Municipal Election.
Management Status Report: Continuing on from prior elections, the project team documented their new or updated processes, developed, monitored and maintained an extensive project plan with a focus on contingency planning. Administratively, backup election locations are identified and retained, support for all coordinators has been retained, hiring standby workers for all election opportunities, a security review has been conducted for all IT systems associated with the election and contingency recommendations have been implemented.
Planned Implementation: To be implemented for the 2010 election.

OCA Observation
Based on our observations during election planning of revised processes, contingency planning, and backup plans, the intent of this recommendation has been satisfied.

2010 Status Update: Complete

5.3. Recommendation 3 - Combine voting stations
The OCA recommends that the Office of the City Clerk evaluate opportunities to combine voting stations to both increase voter accessibility and to increase staffing efficiencies.

Management Status Report: An extensive review of the 2004 and 2007 voter turnout by voting station together with neighbourhood information from the 2008 and 2009 censuses confirmed the designation of 225 voting subdivisions which resulted in 223 voting stations being established for 2010.
Planned Implementation: To be implemented for the 2010 election.

OCA Observation
In 2007, there were eight regular voting stations that reported less than 200 votes (one station had zero votes). In this election, none of the regular voting stations reported fewer than 250 votes. Coupled with the reduced number of regular voting stations from 228 to 223, we are satisfied that the intent of this recommendation has been met.

2010 Status Update: Complete

5.4. Recommendation 4 - Logistics
The OCA recommends that the Office of the City Clerk make the following changes to the supply management process for the 2010 Municipal Election:
- Change the demonstration ballots to more closely resemble the actual ballots
- Provide greater detail on the ward maps
- Label the election forms to indicate position(s) responsible and the form’s application
- Pre-package voting station supplies by positions
Management Status Report: For the 2010 Municipal Election the following has been implemented:

- Ballot demonstration posters will be used to inform electors how to complete the oval on the ballot and will be posted inside each voting screen. Posters will be on the wall by the voting booths and demonstration posters on the table of the Deputy Returning Officer providing the ballot to the voter.
- More detailed maps have been produced by activity - example: Ward maps have voting station locations, population, eligible voters. Voting Station maps show streets, house addresses associated with the Voting Station
- Election position related forms have been identified and developed where appropriate.
- Pre-packaging of voting station supplies by role is occurring.

Planned Implementation: To be implemented for the 2010 Municipal Election.

OCA Observation
During election planning, we observed that the points outlined in the Management Status Report were completed. The intent of this recommendation has been satisfied.

2010 Status Update: Complete

6. 2010 Election Observations and Analysis

We have grouped our observations and analysis into five themes that incorporate our observations from early election planning through post-election reconciliations: 2010 innovations, core staffing levels, training issues, logistics issues, and logic and accuracy issues.

Overall, we believe that the Presiding Deputies\(^\text{12}\) managed the processes reasonably well in the voting stations and in compliance with legislation and guidelines.

During our observations, we did not see any issue arise that would lead us to conclude that the voting process was materially impaired. In general, the processes associated with Election Day worked. While issues did arise, they did not affect the outcomes of any of the individual races.

6.1. 2010 Innovations

As with previous elections, the Office of the City Clerk used the Election 2010 website to communicate extensive information to candidates and voters (where to vote, candidates’ website links, candidate handbooks, etc.). New this year was the opportunity for candidates to download their nomination information packages from the website rather than being required to obtain those packages in hard-copy form from the

\(^\text{12}\) A Presiding Deputy is the individual in charge of the conduct of the election at each voting station.
Office of the City Clerk. Another new feature of the Election 2010 website was inclusion of live and archived webcasts of the candidate forums. A further initiative that seemed to be well-received was the “Future Voter” stickers that were given to children who accompanied their parents.

For the first time, the City of Edmonton incorporated two of the newer social networking tools to create new means of connecting directly with members of the public. The Office of the City Clerk created a Twitter account and a Facebook account for this election. These accounts were used from the time special ballot requests could be submitted (July 1) through Election Day to communicate election information and to give citizens and candidates social media forums for communicating with others. The Office of the City Clerk monitored the Twitter feed throughout Election Day and was able to correct misconceptions or erroneous information posted by members of the public.

6.2. Core staffing levels

The Election Decision Team (see Chart 1) sponsored a complete process review beginning in 2008. As a result of that review, roles and responsibilities were redefined from those used in previous elections. Part of the goal was to ensure that meetings were structured around who needed to be involved in each one, rather than having all of the Planning Team involved in every meeting. The entire Planning Team met periodically to ensure that all team members were aware of where the project stood and of any significant issues that had arisen.

On Election Day, some areas (specific voting stations, remote accumulation sites, Election Central, Election Office call centre, and the information technology hotline) would have benefited from additional staffing during peak times. For instance, both election workers’ and our own direct observations indicated that busy signals were repeatedly encountered during peak times. Lines were busy primarily when election workers were trying to contact Election Central and the IT Hotline at the beginning and just after the end of the time voting stations were open.

In addition, workers at every Remote Accumulation Site were challenged to keep up as ballot tabulators arrived. Each site had a single team to process incoming tabulators from three wards. In the 2007 Municipal Election, each team was responsible for about 40 ballot tabulators. In this election, each team was responsible for processing approximately 60 ballot tabulators and more paperwork than in 2007. One team reported that their worksheets for verifying serial numbers against ballot tabulators were difficult to use, primarily because of the physical size and wide spacing on the forms.

Election Day core and peak staffing levels need to be reviewed and adjusted prior to the 2013 Municipal Election in order to ensure that Election Central, the Information Technology Hotline, Remote Accumulation Sites, and voting stations are staffed adequately. In addition, contingency plans need to be in place to manage emerging workload demands without impacting core election processes.

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13 The 2010 Municipal Election was the first time there were twelve wards instead of six.
Recommendation 1
The OCA recommends that the Returning Officer evaluate core and peak staffing levels from this election in Election Central, the Information Technology Hotline, Remote Accumulation Sites, and voting stations that had bottlenecks with regard to minimizing related issues for the 2013 Municipal Election.

Management Response and Action Plan
Accepted
Action Plan: A review of staffing levels will be included in various stages of the project plan and will be implemented for the 2013 Election.
Planned Implementation Date: October 2013
Responsible Party: Office of the City Clerk, Returning Officer

6.3. Training issues
We reviewed the following Election Day positions: Presiding Deputy Returning Officer, Tabulator Clerk, Ballot Clerk, and Deputy Returning Officer (Door Attendant, ID/Address Clerk, and Registration Clerk).

Presiding Deputy Returning Officers
The most significant training issues we observed were at the Presiding Deputy level (the individual in charge at each voting station). At their three-hour training session, each Presiding Deputy and Assistant Presiding Deputy received an 89-page manual that contained fairly detailed information about not just their role, but also the role of every worker in the voting station. Presiding Deputies need to be familiar with all of these roles in order to effectively and efficiently manage their voting stations.

The Presiding Deputies' training consisted of about three hours of relatively unbroken lecture. That style of training was not the most effective training method – especially not for people working this position, which is responsible for understanding how to manage voting stations and ensure that legislated and otherwise prescribed processes are followed.

We observed some situations that contributed to our conclusion that Presiding Deputy training needs to effectively address real Election Day situations:

- Two people at different voting stations who were known by election workers at those voting stations were allowed to vote without identifying documents.
- A few Presiding Deputies were not aware that voters who had received mail-in ballots, but who chose instead to vote in person, could opt to vote in their assigned voting station after the close of the Special Ballot voting at 7:00 p.m. on Election Day as set out in sec. 44 of the Election Bylaw – Bylaw #15307.
- In three voting stations in which the vote tabulator had malfunctioned, the Presiding Deputy allowed ballots from the auxiliary ballot box to be removed and fed through the vote tabulator during the day. Section 51 of the City’s Election Bylaw requires that those ballots remain in the sealed ballot box until the voting station is closed.
• In some voting stations, line-ups at the ballot tabulator extended behind the voting screens.

We also observed other situations that could be addressed by more practical training (e.g., managing media at voting stations, reporting the number of voters at voting stations throughout the day, responding to voters whose children attend schools with private school boards, checking voter identification documents, properly indicating how to complete the ballot, and completing staff evaluation forms).

Based on our observations, we believe that Presiding Deputies would benefit from being trained using a full mock voting station setup with them having hands-on experience at each position. We acknowledge that such training would not be possible in the current three-hour session, but we believe that the concept should be explored.

Reorganizing the Presiding Deputy training binder to incorporate quick-reference tools and specific checklists would facilitate trouble-free voting stations. The tools should include a topical index of common questions and issues encountered, voting screen setup instructions complete with diagrams, a tab for samples of all forms, and a trouble-shooting guide for commonly encountered problems. Checklists (similar to those used for this election) should be tied to the time of day and/or milestone events. Most of this information is currently included in the Presiding Deputy training binder, but some Presiding Deputies displayed lack of familiarity with the content.

**Tabulator Clerks**

Tabulator Clerk training for the next election should include significant hands-on experience with setting up ballot boxes and feeding ballots into the ballot tabulators. Their training should include discussion of commonly encountered tabulator error messages and hands-on demonstrations of how to resolve those errors. Their training manual should also include a distinct section addressing how to solve easily fixed tabulator errors. Several Tabulator Clerks seemed unsure of how to deal with any error messages or ballot jams themselves and called the Information Technology Hotline for assistance.

We also observed that some Tabulator Clerks did not set up and/or seal their ballot boxes correctly.

At a Remote Accumulation Site, we observed that four machines were delivered with missing or broken seals. This is a notable control failure and emphasizes the need to stress the purpose of and rationale for maintaining seal integrity on the ballot tabulators during Tabulator Clerk training. We were able to confirm that the number of votes recorded on the tabulators matched the number of ballots cast at each of these voting stations through different processes developed by the project team.

**Ballot Clerks**

We observed that some Ballot Clerks did not follow the prescribed processes. For example, some did not mark the ballot types that they issued to voters and one
removed a spoiled ballot from the secrecy sleeve to see why it was spoiled. Some Ballot Clerks did not perform interim ballot reconciliations correctly, increasing the risk that ballot counts would not balance after the voting station was closed. Additional process explanations, discussion of process rationales, and more hands-on training exercises should improve the consistency with which Ballot Clerks perform their duties.

**Door Attendants, ID/Address Clerks, and Registration Clerks**
The changes in training models for the 2010 Municipal Election were effective for most of the voting station workers (Door Attendants, ID/Address Clerks, and Registration Clerks). These workers received ward-based training sessions that used hands-on training in the context of voting station mock-ups. Some of these workers commented that their training was quite effective and we observed few issues associated with those positions.

**Training Summary**
We believe that effectively addressing the above training issues with an enhanced hands-on training model would significantly reduce the likelihood that the issues discussed in this section will reoccur in the 2013 Municipal Election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 2</th>
<th>Management Response and Action Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The OCA recommends that the Returning Officer expand hands-on and mock training for key positions (Presiding Deputies, Assistant Presiding Deputies, Tabulator Clerks, and Ballot Clerks) to better prepare them for situations they are likely to encounter on Election Day.</td>
<td>Accepted Action Plan: Will be implemented for the 2013 Election and included in project plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned Implementation Date: October 2013</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Responsible Party: Office of the City Clerk, Returning Officer</td>
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</table>

**6.4. Logistics issues**
The logistics issues that arose on Election Day demonstrate a need to better manage certain aspects of the election planning processes.

**Voting Station Supply Issues**
Ballot Clerks are responsible for verifying that they have the correct ballot types when they receive their supplies prior to Election Day. In one instance the Ballot Clerk had the wrong public school ballot type, resulting in voters having to choose whether or not to return to vote at a later time after the correct ballot types arrived.

There were also several instances of some materials missing from voting station supply boxes (e.g., ballot transfer boxes, Tabulator Clerk worksheet, lists of voters who received mail-in ballots, scissors, and directional signs). Providing the Presiding Deputy with a complete list of supplies that should be at their voting station could reduce some of the confusion we observed in the 2010 Municipal Election.
The maps at voting stations this year included house numbers, not just streets. That was a helpful change as voters sought to confirm that they were in the correct voting station. The maps could be further improved by adding voting subdivision boundary marks, names, and addresses for adjacent voting stations to assist voters who come to the wrong voting station.

**Ballot Tabulator Repair**
The location of the ballot tabulator repair centre was another logistics issue that became apparent during Election Day. With the only ballot tabulator repair centre in the west end of the City, the information technology support team members had to travel much further than they would have if there had been a repair centre at each ward office.

**Remote Accumulation Sites**
As each voting station closed, the Tabulator Clerk took the ballot tabulator to their assigned Remote Accumulation Site. Workers at the Remote Accumulation Sites received the ballot tabulators, verified serial numbers, removed the memory cards, copied the voting results from the memory cards, and transmitted the results for each voting station to Results Central. Staff at Results Central then received the voting results for each station, consolidated the results, and reported them to the public.

We observed a few opportunities for improvement at the Remote Accumulation Sites. In two instances, the trucks dispatched to return the election equipment to the Election Office did not arrive as scheduled and workers had to wait for them rather than being able to load them as they finished each ballot tabulator.

Each ballot tabulator has two serial numbers (one on the machine itself and one on the memory card seal) and one voting station number. By the time the ballot tabulators are delivered to the Remote Accumulation Sites, they have been subject to a minimum of four serial number and voting station number validation cycles: when the programmed memory cards are inserted and sealed into the tabulator, when the tabulators are provided to the Ward Coordinators, when the tabulators are received by the Tabulator Clerks, and when the Area Supervisors verify that each voting station has the correct tabulator. It would be faster for the staff at the Remote Accumulation Sites to validate only the memory card seal number against the voting station. If the seal is intact, the accuracy of the votes cast at each voting station and the integrity of the election would not be compromised. Remote Accumulation Site workers need to have defined procedures to follow in the event that ballot tabulators arrive with broken or missing seals.

**Where-to-Vote Cards**
Where-to-Vote cards are sent to each residential address prior to each Municipal Election to communicate advance vote and Election Day voting opportunities. We observed that some voters went to advance vote locations on Election Day instead of their assigned voting stations, reportedly because they misunderstood the directions. It may be possible to reduce such misunderstandings by redesigning the cards prior to the next election.
For the 2010 Municipal Election, the Election Office sent approximately 356,000 cards to residential addresses, using addresses in the City’s Geographic Information System. About 12,000 cards were returned. About one-third (4,000) of the cards were sent to vacant, but legitimate addresses. The remaining resulted from addresses associated with entryways in apartments, suites or units that don’t exist (e.g., mechanical rooms), titled parking stalls, single buildings that straddle multiple lots, properties for which Canada Post and the City’s Geographic Information System have different addresses, etc. The cost of printing and mailing 8,000 cards (about $5,600) is not a significant proportion of the total Election budget (about $3.2 million). However, creating a new addressing layer in the Geographic Information System to ensure that Where-to-Vote cards are sent only to legitimate residential addresses would also benefit the City’s annual census process, since it uses the same address system.

**Ballots**

Because the final candidate list is not confirmed until noon on the day following Nomination Day, ballots must be printed, packaged, and delivered within the two weeks following Nomination Day. Once the Nominees are finalized, the Returning Officer sends the candidate names to the vendor, the vendor prints ballot proofs, the Returning Officer validates the proofs, the vendor then prints and packages the ballots and programs a laser printer to print ballots-on-demand for mail-in ballots. Once the ballot packages are delivered to the Election Office, they are packed for each voting station and ward office. They are then picked up by voting station staff and used in the designated voting stations.

Ballot supply for the 2010 Municipal Election was problematic. The first issue encountered was with ballot delivery, which finally happened three days later than scheduled, requiring several Election Office staff to work overtime on a weekend in order to receive the ballots and prepare for the first voting opportunity on Monday. Secondly, ballots were to be packaged in quantities of 100, but actual counts ranged between about 95 and 120. While it is normal to have some packages for which the actual ballot count is not exactly 100, the frequency and size of count variations this year was significant. Ballot Clerks must hand count ballots as they open packages to confirm the actual number of ballots received and enter any variance from the expected 100 ballots in their ballot accounting worksheet. Inconsistent quantities from package to package add to the Ballot Clerks' challenges with reconciling their ballot counts.
Recommendation 3

The OCA recommends that the Returning Officer evaluate the voting station supply, tabulator repair, remote accumulation site procedure, where-to-vote card addressing, and ballot supply and packaging issues encountered in this election and revise processes to avoid recurrence in the 2013 Municipal Election.

Management Response and Action Plan

**Accepted**

Action Plan: A review of process will be included in the project plan and process improvements will be implemented for the 2013 Election.

Planned Implementation Date: October 2013

Responsible Party: Office of the City Clerk, Returning Officer

### 6.5. Logic and accuracy issues

The City’s contract with the election equipment supplier relied heavily on the vendor to:

- Prepare, print, and deliver the ballots,
- Set up and operate results collection and interface systems,
- Set up the tabulators by programming the memory cards,
- Conduct logic and accuracy testing of the systems, and
- Resolve issues with tabulator malfunctions.

During ballot tabulator verification testing and on Election Day, we observed the following issues:

- Catholic School Board ward numbers were initially missing (corrected prior to voting)
- One candidate’s name was initially misspelled (corrected prior to voting)
- Five tabulators were programmed for the wrong ballot types (corrected prior to voting)
- A candidate withdrawal resulted in a reporting system interface error (corrected immediately on Election Day)
- Votes were reported for an acclaimed race (corrected immediately on Election Day)

During tabulation of the results, votes recorded and stored on one memory card were not reported on Election Day, but during final reconciliation of reported votes cast to ballots used and prior to issuing the final election outcomes to the Province. There should have been processes in the results systems to catch any missed cards on election night. We believe that the City needs to develop a parallel results checking process for election night.

Since the Returning Officer is solely responsible for election outcomes, the City needs to take a larger role in validating the systems set up by the vendor. The Returning Officer needs to re-examine election timelines, roles, responsibilities, and process controls. That review needs to focus especially on processes associated with ballot tabulator and results system testing and validation. Based on the outcome of the review,
the Returning Officer needs to make staffing adjustments to ensure that the logic and accuracy issues noted above do not recur in the 2013 Municipal Election.

All of the logic and accuracy issues we observed were corrected prior to reporting the final results to the Province. In three cases, corrections were made prior to any voting. In two cases, issues were resolved on Election Day. The tabulation of results issue was resolved during ballot reconciliation following Election Day.

In a much closer election, the control issues we observed could have affected the outcome of one or more races. The Returning Officer needs to 1) ensure strong oversight and accountability of external vendors charged with executing portions of the total election process and 2) minimize the risk of incomplete system validation steps. This will include creating contingency plans in the event that a vendor fails to deliver at any step in the election process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 4</th>
<th>Management Response and Action Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The OCA recommends that the Returning Officer ensure that the electoral process is revised to:</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Enhance internal project management and oversight processes to ensure that the City effectively manages all portions of the electoral process,</td>
<td>Action Plan: Will be implemented for the 2013 Election and included in project plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Identify root causes for each of the logic and accuracy and system validation issues encountered in this election and redesign processes accordingly,</td>
<td>Planned Implementation Date: October 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Revise vendor contracts to more clearly and thoroughly define roles and responsibilities of both the City and the vendor(s), and</td>
<td>Responsible Party: Office of the City Clerk, Returning Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Enhance contract requirements and consequences for vendor non-performance or under-performance.</td>
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7. Petition

During the final weeks of planning for the 2010 Municipal Election, the City Centre Airport petition was delivered to the City Clerk. In addition to being responsible for managing all municipal elections and censuses, the Election and Census Office is responsible for the validation of petitions. The petition received had the potential of placing questions on the ballot. The Election and Census Office hired approximately 60 additional people for approximately 3 weeks to input the data from the petition. In addition, the Office of the City Clerk’s key election planning staff, who are trained and responsible for petition checking, worked on the petition. This use of election planning
staff negatively impacted the completion of planned election validations during that same time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 5</th>
<th>Management Response and Action Plan</th>
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</table>
| The OCA recommends that the Returning Officer develop contingency plans for effectively managing a city-wide petition received during the four months prior to any general election. | Accepted  
Action Plan: Contingency plans will be developed.  
Planned Implementation Date: November 2012  
Responsible Party: Office of the City Clerk, Returning Officer |

8. Conclusions

We were pleased to be asked once again to participate in the election planning process and to conduct Election Day observations. Several of the changes implemented from the 2007 Municipal Election were effective in reducing related issues in this election. Requiring Ballot Clerks and Assistant Presiding Deputies to conduct interim ballot reconciliations seemed to alleviate some of the ballot reconciliation issues following close of voting for this election. Using mock exercises in the Ward-based training was also reported to be an effective process.

Based on our observations, the 2010 Municipal Election was carried out in compliance with legislative requirements and in a fair and equitable manner. While issues did arise, they in no way affected the outcomes of any of the individual races.

We thank the Office of the City Clerk for their cooperation and assistance in conducting this project.